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The “Vast Wasteland” Speech 
Revisited 
Jonathan Blake* 
It is fascinating to reread the “Vast Wasteland” speech—Newt 
Minow’s first major policy utterance as the “new frontiersman” assumed 
the helm at the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or 
“Commission”) over forty years ago. There are all sorts of themes from the 
speech to write about: how remarkable it is that a talk delivered in 1961 by 
an FCC Chairman should be recalled forty years later, let alone written 
about; the limited space it in fact devoted to the “vast wasteland” theme; 
and its cultural congruence with the Kennedy embrace of change in, and 
challenge to, the existing order that toppled segregation, launched the 
environmental movement, ultimately inspired the antiwar agitation, and 
revolutionized dress, music, morals, and culture generally. (Newt Minow 
may have had more in common with John Lennon than he realized.) Of 
course, this era followed after the comfortable (for most) conformism of 
Ike and the post-World War II era. I was tempted to write about these other 
topics but decided to discuss what the speech did not address but 
assumed—the framework of administrative law on which it was premised 
and which has become so radically undermined in the ensuing decades. 
What I was about to learn about administrative law was to be taught 
to me by the redoubtable Professor Alex Bickel at Yale Law School. My 
early experience practicing before the FCC a couple of years later 
confirmed the administrative law principles that I had been taught. There 
were bad decisions, to be sure, but there was a common understanding of 
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how administrative agencies were supposed to work, and one could 
evaluate their performance (in fact the performance of all three parts of the 
process—Congress and the courts, as well as the FCC) against this 
common set of well-understood and, for the most part, well-accepted 
principles. 
Back then the conventional wisdom was that Congress enacted broad 
principles and policy objectives; the agency used its expertise to flesh them 
out in roughly equal measure via specific rulemakings and adjudications; 
and the courts deferred to the agency’s implementation of these principles 
and policy objectives, unless the agency’s decisions were adopted pursuant 
to faulty procedures or were clearly wrong. Since then, a strong case can be 
made that all three branches of government have deviated substantially 
from their historic and intended roles and that this is as important a change 
from the era of the wasteland speech as any of the topics it specifically 
addressed. 
CONGRESS  
Both formally (in legislation) and increasingly informally (through 
letters, meetings between staffs, and phone calls), Congress is taking 
positions on very narrow communications issues which, under old 
administrative law concepts, it should leave to the decision-making of the 
expert agency, subject, of course, to Congress’s general oversight. This has 
spawned the quite remarkable countertrend of the FCC leaving certain 
decisions to Congress. A case in point is the FCC’s long reluctance to take 
the steps necessary to implement the digital television transition, despite 
direction from Congress in 1992 and 1996, and its relegation to Congress to 
undertake the task of implementation. And because it understandably lacks 
expertise as to the details, Congress can be less than clear in these 
circumstances. Thus, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 generated the 
rather odd outcome of two sets of Congressmen litigating in court against 
each other over the meaning of the same provisions—provisions that they 
themselves had enacted.1 This anecdote suggests that Congress tried to go 
too far into the details and, as a result, passed a confusing statute, whereas 
Congress should have adopted broad principles and left the specifics to the 
FCC. 
Further evidencing a weakening confidence in the administrative 
agency process, Congress has also burdened the FCC with all sorts of 
procedural requirements: analysis of the impact of its actions on small 
 
 1. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). 
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businesses; the Regulatory Flexibility Act;2 analysis of the time required by 
private entities to comply with FCC requirements; clearance of new FCC 
forms by the Office of Management and Budget; and the Sunshine Act, 
which bars more than two commissioners from conferring privately on 
issues. The latest congressionally imposed mechanism for policing the 
agency is the Biennial Review process, which a three-judge panel recently 
described in oral arguments as “absurd,” “ridiculous,” and “lacking in 
sense.”3 Many, including Commission personnel, moan about the FCC’s 
reversal record in court, but some responsibility may lie with Congress and, 
as we shall see, with the courts themselves. 
THE COURTS 
Recent court decisions reviewing FCC actions reflect a mood toward 
the agency process that might be described as sour. Even when not stated 
expressly, a fair reading of various court opinions reveals frustration, 
disillusionment, and confusion over how the administrative process is 
working. Although the criticism is most often directed at the hapless 
agency, Congress, as noted above, is sometimes its target. As with 
Congress, there is a sense that the courts have lost confidence in the 
process; the concept of the agency’s partnering with the other two branches 
of the government (the FCC and Congress) to make the system succeed is 
recognized in the breach. 
Substantively, the courts’ interpretations of the First Amendment and 
the Takings Clause4 of the Constitution have radically changed the legal 
environment in which the FCC operates. The FCC’s freedom of action is 
substantially cramped by these doctrines, which are far more constraining 
than they were forty years ago. The “Vast Wasteland” speech 
unselfconsciously, unashamedly, and without fear of the First Amendment 
or other judicially enforced constraints assumes that the FCC can and 
should oversee and regulate the quality of broadcasters’ programming. It is 
in this respect, more than any other, that the speech seems outdated. 
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 
It is hard not to have sympathy for the challenges that the FCC faces 
today. In addition to the inevitable dulling of the original mandate of the 
 
 2. Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-
612 (2000)). 
 3. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (comments of Edwards, C.J., 
Ginsburg, J., and Sentelle, J., at Oral Arguments Tr. 11, 41, 44, 59), reh’g granted, 293 F.3d 
537 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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FCC over the past forty years (there is no dulling in Minow’s speech), there 
are trends outside the FCC’s control, some already noted, that have made 
its job far more difficult. The rapidity and radical consequences of 
technological change, the expanding breadth of its jurisdiction, the 
complexity of the issues, the sheer size and importance of the industries it 
affects—all these pose enormous challenges for the FCC. The world of the 
“Vast Wasteland” speech was far simpler. 
Some of the FCC’s critics, noting these challenges and the 
shortcomings of the administrative process, call for the FCC’s substantial 
overhaul. It has lived through the Clinton-Gore Administration reinventing 
government and the Republican-driven FCC restructuring of 2001. Neither 
has had discernible impact on the success of the Commission or on how it 
operates. Other, more radical, restructuring proposals have surfaced from 
time to time, but they have promised too much, blinked realities, and/or 
ignored the practical problems of implementation. Even the demise of the 
FCC is urged by some—at a time when the rest of the world, moving 
toward privatization of its communications industries in order to emulate 
the United States’s successes, seeks to understand how to establish an 
independent agency (like the FCC) to referee the disputes that their newly 
privatized environment inevitably will generate. 
But let us turn back to trends within the FCC’s administration of its 
mandate that illustrate how things have changed in forty years and why the 
administrative/legislative process that regulates the communications 
industries is in trouble. 
A SLAVISH DEVOTION TO RULEMAKING                                             
AND BRIGHT-LINE TESTS   
Justice Holmes said that law is the “triumph of experience over 
logic.”5 But over the past four decades, the FCC has relied increasingly on 
rulemaking and bright-line tests and has drastically cut back on hearings 
and case-by-case determinations. In this agency, at least, a civil law 
philosophy has come to control rather than the common law approach. This 
trend may have contributed to the agency’s diminished credibility. Its claim 
to expertise, which should help ward off invasion into specific areas by 
Congress and should entitle it to judicial deference, was, in Professor 
Bickel’s day, to be based in part on its experience in dealing with specific 
cases. By relying so exclusively on rules, the Commission has deprived 
itself of this experience. Newt Minow’s speech exhibits no presumption 
that the FCC will adopt across-the-board rules to deal with poor 
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programming, the television community’s reliance on ratings, and 
children’s programming—three of the topics he singled out in 1961.6 
Interestingly, the Powell administration has embarked on a few 
modest steps toward more case-by-case determinations. Its greater 
emphasis on enforcement actions, which are fact-specific, is a case in point. 
Another is the FCC’s willingness to consider in its omnibus multiple-
ownership rulemaking a system of presumptive, rather than determinative, 
guidelines that could be rebutted by showings based on particular 
circumstances in individual cases. An additional example of a common law 
approach to regulation is political broadcasting. The statute, particularly the 
lowest-unit-charge principle,7 may be vague and flexible, but desirably so. 
Implementing that law, the Commission staff has come to know the 
broadcast and cable advertising industry and, through its handling of 
complaints, keeps up with new developments. It has developed expertise of 
the sort that lay at the heart of traditional administrative law forty years 
ago. The FCC’s political-broadcast decisions may not always be right, but 
they are informed and fact-specific, and by and large a very complex area 
of law is well understood by those it affects: candidates, agencies, and 
stations alike. (By contrast, the congressional debates on this subject are, to 
be candid, ignorant and ill-informed.) The body of law that has developed 
is at least as clear as rules adopted by the Commission in other regulatory 
areas, and far more supple and adaptable. 
A GREATER RELIANCE ON EXPERTS AND  
A LESSER RELIANCE ON EXPERIENCE 
A corollary is that the FCC today seems more enamored of big 
theories than it used to be. Economists, who could learn something from 
Holmes’s aphorism, play a much bigger role in Commission policymaking. 
They tell the Commission how the markets should work, whereas the 
Commission used to learn from individual cases how the markets, in fact, 
worked. The decline in the number of engineers at the FCC, which this 
Commission has tried hard to reverse, has meant a greater reliance on 
engineering theory and less exposure to real-world engineering facts that 
the FCC’s field bureaus, testing labs, and monitoring stations—all victims 
of the federal budget axe—used to provide. 
 
 6. Newton N. Minow, Television and the Public Interest, Speech Before the National 
Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961). 
 7. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
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THE DECLINE IN PROCEDURES THAT PROVIDE  
THE COMMISSION WITH CASE-BY-CASE EXPERIENCE  
When Minow delivered his speech and for a decade or two thereafter, 
oral arguments were a staple of Commission procedures. When ITT sought 
to acquire ABC in the late 1960s, the FCC held two full days of oral 
argument.8 The number of cases that were heard before the full 
Commission and produced a record far exceeded the number that do so 
today. To be sure, the Commission has adopted the mechanism of 
congressional-style panels—the one on financial problems in the 
telecommunications sector is a recent example.9 But by and large, these 
panels are devoted to generic issues, often rulemakings. The FCC’s panel 
on the AOL/Time Warner merger was one of few that were directed at a 
specific transaction.10 The Commission no longer hears oral arguments on 
decisions on appeal from the bureaus, and in the case of those appeals, 
which are based solely on a written record, the bureau itself drafts the 
recommended decision disposing of the appeal from its original decision. 
THE ALLURE OF THE BIG SOLUTION 
The doctrine of ascertainment was to end disputes between 
community groups and television stations. The lowest-unit-charge 
legislation was to satisfy politicians’ clamoring for lower advertising rates. 
The eight-voice, top-four test was to bring rationality to duopoly law.11 
First lotteries, and then auctions, were intended to end controversy in the 
licensing process. And now a spectrum-commons or spectrum-ownership 
approach, or some combination of the two, is being touted as allocating 
radio frequencies in calibration with the public need. (It should be noted, 
however, that the proponents of spectrum reform have stressed the 
desirability to begin with implementing their new theories on a limited 
basis; for example, frequency band by frequency band.) 
The philosophy of the common law is based on humility. We will 
never get it right for all time; we always need the escape hatch and the 
 
 8. See Applications by ABC for Assignment of Licenses of Stations, Opinion and 
Order on Petition for Reconsideration, 9 F.C.C.2d 546, para. 4, 10 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 289 
(1967). 
 9. Restoring Financial Health to the Telecommunications Sector: En Banc Hearing on 
Steps Toward Recovery in the Telecommunications Industry Before the FCC (Oct. 7, 2002), 
transcript available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/enbanc/100702/tr021007.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 
2003). 
 10. Applications of America Online, Inc., and Time Warner, Inc. for Transfers of 
Control, CS Dkt. No. 00-30: En Banc Hearing Before the FCC (July 27, 2000), transcript 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/tr072700.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2003). 
 11. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b). 
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learning laboratory that individual cases give us. Even if government does 
get it right for a moment in time, technology changes, social priorities 
change, and markets change. There is no evidence that humility does not 
continue to be a desirable ingredient in government decision-making. It 
was not, however, a notable component of the “Vast Wasteland” speech. 
OTHER TRENDS 
Other developments since Minow’s speech might be cited: the rise in 
the power of the staff prompted in part by the Sunshine Act; the trend of 
relying on private, party-by-party lobbying to frame and illuminate the 
issues; a reliance, generally, on draft “items” prepared by the bureaus to 
launch commissioner involvement in substantive issues; the chairman’s 
control over the agenda; the miniscule role of written pleadings in actual 
Commission decision-making; and the prolixity of Commission rulemaking 
notices. All of these and others might be examined to assess their effect on 
the administrative process. 
CONCLUSION 
Comparing the self-assurance of Minow’s speech (some would say it 
was too self-assured) with the tentativeness of today’s FCC, one is tempted 
to urge a broader, deeper review of the administrative process. It may be no 
accident that several of the agencies that existed in 1961—the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board, to name two—
have been terminated or radically restructured. In any event, it has been 
more than forty years since Judge Landis headed up the panel to review the 
working of administrative agencies, and much longer since the 
Administrative Procedure Act was passed.12 The scope of a new review of 
administrative law should include the roles of Congress and the courts, as 
well as those of the agencies. There might emerge a vision for how the 
process should function—a vision that would be shared by the agencies, 
Congress, and the courts, and then might be better understood by the public 
as well. Otherwise, the administrative process that governs our critical 







 12. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 5 U.S.C. (2000)). 
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